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Estonian Defence- Ten Years of Development 
Introduction 
This study aims to provide an overview and 
short analysis of how the defence forces of 
one Baltic state- Estonia- have developed. 
A brief parallel with the early years of the 
Estonian republic from1918-1940 will be 
drawn, and current policy goals, development 
of structures and allocation of resources 
reviewed. These will be seen not just in the 
context of NATO and EU integration, but 
rather in the framework of developing Estonia's 
defence capability and enhancing its military 
security. The choice of the subject is also mo-
tivated by the realisation that, while Estonia 
is engaged in an intensive international co-
operation, the prime focus has to be on an 
indigenous integral Estonian defence capa-
bility. 
The development of Estonia's defence 
structures began soon after regaining 
independence in August 1991. By the end of 
the year the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) 
and its General Staff were legally established. 
The Estonian Ministry of Defence was set up 
in July 1992. Almost simultaneously an active 
Estonian involvement began in the political-
military co-operation initiated by NATO. 
Estonia has participated in NACC from 1991, 
and subsequently in EAPC. 
Estonia joined the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) programme in February 1994 and 
subsequently joined the PfP Planning and 
Review Process (PARP) at the beginning of 
1995. Since 1996 intensive bilateral dialogue 
on issues concerning the enlargement of 
NATO has taken place between Estonia and 
NATO. Already in September 2001 Estonia 
submitted the third annual plan under the 
Membership Action Plan framework to 
NATO. As of 2001 Estonia is working on 
attaining the 62 Partnership Goals. The scope 
of the work associated with an implemen-tat-
ion of the Partnership Goals is illustrated by 
the fact that the most general of these goals 
(PG G 0028) required a comprehensive Force 
Structure Review to be conducted in 2001. 
The fundamental outcome of the Review was 
a definition of the required military capa-
bilities, the future organisation of the EDF, 
and a proposal for a new command and con-
trol structure of the EDF. The very short term 
priorities of the EDF development include 
establishment of the Joint Operations Staff, 
development of surveillance capabilities, trai-
ning units for one infantry brigade and 
carrying out a training review to bring 
training into accordance with new require-
ments. 
Estonia has concluded bilateral co-operation 
agreements or signed Memorandums of Un-
derstanding with 18 countries and concluded 
a trilateral co-operation agreement with Lat-
via and Lithuania. 
Estonian Defence Forces are engaged in 
practical defence co-operation with Latvia and 
Lithuania through the joint co-operation 
projects BALTBAT (Baltic Battalion), BAL-
TRON (Baltic Naval Squadron), BALTNET 
(Baltic Air Surveillance Network). The senior 
staff officers of the defence forces of the Baltic 
states are being trained in BALTDEFCOL 
(Baltic Defence College). 
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In 2001 Estonia had for the first time a 
comprehensive set of documents (laws, 
security concept, military strategy) regulating 
and guiding the development of the national 
defence. 
In other words Estonia has achieved much 
since 1991. To evaluate how Estonia has been 
developing its defence capabiliry, this study 
will look at the basic security and defence 
documents, force posture, command lines, 
acquisition process and defence budgeting, and 
participation in international operations and 
in arms control. The securiry environment 
since 1991 will also be outlined. First, 
background information about Estonia and 
the history of its armed forces will be provided, 
as both the geography and history of Estonia 
have influenced the country's achievements 
since 1991. 
The General 
Characterisation of Estonia 
Estonia is situated on the coast of the Baltic 
Sea and the Gulf of Finland and has land 
borders with the Republic of Latvia and the 
Russian Federation. Estonia's closest overseas 
neighbour is Finland with Helsinki less than 
50nm away from Tallinn. 
Estonia is a maritime country - the length 
of its coastline (3,800 km) is about 6 times 
longer than that of the mainland border. 
Estonia's geography is surprisingly diverse: 
there are over 1,500 islands, 1,000 lakes (they 
cover 5% of Estonia's territory) and 7,000 
rivers and streams in Estonia. Bogs and 
wooded swamplands of different types cover 
approximately one fifth of the country. 
Estonia's main natural resources are shale oil, 
peat, phosphorite, blue clay, limestone, 
dolomite, and arable land. 
Estonia can be described as a small country 
in every respect. Its territory is 45 227 km2 
and the population is 1,439,197.1 The ethnic 
composition of the population is ap-
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proximately 65% Estonians and 35% other 
nationalities. Russians (the largest minority 
group) make up approximately 28% of the 
total population.2 The population of Estonia 
is not distributed equally between different 
regions; 28% of the total population live in 
Tallinn. 
Estonia's GDP constituted in 1999 75,4 bil-
lion kroons, roughly US $4.5 billion) Of that 
agriculture makes up 3.6%, industry 30.7%, 
and services 65.7%. The advantages Estonia's 
economy have enjoyed since regaining 
independence have been proximity to main 
European markets, location between Eastern 
and Western Europe, relatively low wages and 
a skilled labour force. Estonia became a 
member of the World Trade Organisation in 
November 1999. 
Estonia's foreign trade is oriented towards 
the EU. The EU takes roughly 70-80% of 
Estonia's exports and provides roughly 60% 
of Estonia's imports. Estonia's exports go 
mainly to Finland, Germany, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, whereas the exports to member 
states of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States accounted only for 4% of total exports 
in 2000 (6% in 1999). Estonia imports mainly 
from Finland, Sweden and Germany. Russia 
is in fourth position, providing 8.5% of all 
imports. 
Estonia's main export articles are machinery 
and equipment, wood and wooden products, 
textiles, and metallurgical products. Machin-
ery and equipment, agricultural and food 
products, metals and metallurgical products 
make up the imports.4 
A Historical Review of the EDF 
The history of the EDF began on 23 April 
1917 when Colonel Siegfried Pinding was 
given the task of establishing the first Estonian 
regiment. The political preconditions for the 
birth of the EDF evolved after the Russian 
February Revolution of 1917 when Estonia 
was transfonned into an autonomous pro-
vince. The required personnel were already 
available- over 100,000 Estonians were mo-
bilised into the Russian army during the Great 
War and 10,000 of them lost their lives on 
the battlefields. Two thousand Estonians be-
came officers during the war. The Estonian 
officer corps included men who had served in 
high positions in the Russian army and who also 
had received an academic military education. 
By February 1918, units consisting of Eston-
ians were concentrated in Estonia and united 
into one division (35,000 men, 750 officers) 
under the command of Colonel]ohan Laidoner. 
The independence of the Republic of Estonia 
was declared on 24 February 1918. It was 
not recognised by Germany and, in the course 
of its offensive, Tallinn was occupied on 25 
February and Narva by 4 March 1918. Eston-
ian armed forces were demobilised soon after 
the beginning of the occupation. The German 
occupation power allowed only the 3,000 
man-strong Estonian police force to operate. 
The summer of 1918 made it clear that 
Germany would not be able to win the World 
War and the failure of the German occupation 
was likely to be followed by immediate 
aggression from Soviet Russia. On 11 No-
vember 1918 Germany surrendered to the 
Allies and the Provisional Government of 
Estonia with General Larka as the Minister 
of Defence resumed its activities in Tallinn. 
The only armed organisation subordinated 
to the government at that time was the 
Estonian Defence League (EDL) the format-
ion of which began illegally during the Ger-
man occupation. The EDL was created on 
the basis of a territorial principle, all over 
the country and under command of former 
national units' officers. By the end of Novem-
ber the EDL had 14,500 members, a few hund-
red rifles and a few dozen machine guns. 
The Red Army attack on Narva on 28 No-
vember 1918 signified the beginning of the 
Independence War. Estonia received military 
assistance from the very beginning of the war: 
ammunition and volunteers from Finland, a 
British Royal Navy's cruiser squadron pro-
vided a coastal defence and controlled the 
Gulf of Finland, etc. In the battles 2-6 January 
1919, the Estonian Armed Forces halted the 
previously successful enemy. By the first 
anniversary of the Republic the enemy was 
expelled from Estonia. The Independence War 
was ended by the Tartu Peace Treaty signed 
on 2 February 1920. Here, Russia abandoned 
all territorial claims to Estonian territory. The 
war took the lives of 5,000 Estonians. 
By the end of the Independence War there 
were 85,000 men in the Estonian armed forces 
with a reserve of 32,000 men. The armed 
forces equipment had improved drastically: 
Estonia had by then 10 armoured trains, 12 
armoured cars and tanks, 28 aircraft, 25 
warships and two dozens auxiliary ships. 
Estonia had received material assistance from 
Great Britain, France, United States, Finland 
and Denmark. 
After the Independence War, the structure 
of national defence in Estonia remained 
largely unchanged. Lieutenant General Niko-
lai Reek graduated as the first Estonian from 
the French Military Academy. He brought the 
training of the Estonian Armed Forces into 
accordance with European principles and 
tradition. Estonia established its own Military 
Academy in 1921. In 1928 Estonia gave up 
two-year conscription and switched to a one-
year system. Territorial defence became the 
basis of Estonia's defence in 19 34 after the 
nomination of General Johan Laidoner as 
Commander-in-Chief. 
Estonia's policies in the inter-war period 
were guided by the strong feeling of lack of 
security. Already in November 1919 at the 
Paris Peace Conference Estonia proposed the 
idea of creating a Baltic League with the aim 
of thereby safeguarding the freedom of the 
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Baltic Sea and preventing any German or Rus-
sian dominance. In the autumn of 1919 Lat-
via also proposed a similar idea of a Baltic 
Union at the meeting of the Finnish, Estonian, 
Latvian and Lithuanian prime ministers in Tartu. 
The first materialisation of such thinking 
occurred on 17 March 1922 in Warsaw when 
delegations from Finland, Estonia, Latvia and 
Poland signed a treaty recognizing their 
common borders. The agreement also referred 
to co-ordinating signatories' foreign policies, 
mutual assistance in the event of aggression. 
In February 1934, co-operation between Lat-
via and Estonia led to the creation of a milit-
ary union. Lithuania decided to join it in Sep-
tember 1934. The Treaty of Concordia and 
Cooperation among three Baltic states was 
signed in Geneva. This unity was, however, 
not to last and it collapsed slowly in the late 
1930s when Estonia orientated its policy 
toward Germany and Poland in contrast to 
Latvia and Lithuania which were more ori-
entated toward the USSR. 
Before the Second World War, Estonian 
armed forces had a trained reserve as large as 
14 7,000 men of whom 43,000 were mem-bers 
of the Defence League. The mobilisation plan 
envisioned the call-up of 6,500 officers, 
15,000 NCOs and 80,000 soldiers. The Army 
was sufficiently equipped with light weapons 
and had, with mobilisation stocks, 250 guns, 
50 anti-tank and 25 anti-aircraft guns. 
The question whether Estonia should have 
resisted Soviet pressure and ultimatums in 
1939-1940 will probably be an object of 
speculation for some time. The fact is that the 
EDF were well trained and later - in the 
Second World War - most of the ready 
reserves (around 100,000 men altogether) 
were mobilised either by the Soviet Union or 
Germany. Some Estonians also fought 
voluntarily in the Finnish Defence Forces. 
The Second World War resulted in a con-
siderable loss of population for Estonia. In 
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addition to those lost in battle some 70,000 
people fled Estonia during the war. In 1944-
1956 an anti-Soviet resistance continued 
mostly in the form of guerrilla war. About 
6,000-7,000 of the partisans were killed, and 
very many people were arrested. 
The annexation of Estonia by the Soviet 
Union in 1940 ended the existence of the EDF 
for the next half century. A massive number 
of Soviet troops was stationed in Estonia (see 
below}. The extensive exodus of Estonians 
during the war meant that they have served 
in the armed forces of several countries since 
the end of the Second World War. In addition 
to the Soviet armed forces, Estonians have 
also been in the US, Canadian, and Swedish 
armed forces, to name a few. The military 
training and experience gained that way have 
been important in rebuilding the EDF since 
1991. 
As in 1918, the re-establishment of the 
Estonian Defence Forces in the 1990s also 
started from the Defence League. It was 
reanimated by a national initiative on 17 
February 1990 in one of Estonia's counties, 
i.e. already one and a half years before 
regaining independence in August 1991. On 
28 April1992 the EDL was incorporated into 
the Estonian Defence Forces. Two weeks after 
regaining independence, the Supreme Council 
adopted the decision on general conscription. 
The next steps included the formation of the 
General Staff under the command of then 
Colonel Ants Laaneots and on 13 April1992 
the Ministry of Defence was established with 
Mr. Olo Uluots as the first Minister of Defence. 
The number of available trained personnel 
was, however, much smaller than in 1917. 
By 1 January 1992 there were 27 officers, 48 
NCOs and 10 conscripts in the Estonian 
Defence Forces. A year later there were 84 
officers, 213 NCOs and 829 conscripts. 
Despite the lack of trained personnel and from 
interruption of the military tradition for half 
a century, in 1991 there was a strong national 
conviction as to the necessity of having Eston-
ian defence structures. It found its expression 
in the creation of the EDL on the basis of 
public initiative even before the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. 
Other circumstances favoured the re-
establishment of the EDF. In sharp contrast 
to the situation in 1917-1918 when Estonia 
was actually in the middle of an ongoing war, 
the situation was peaceful in 1991-1992. 
Whereas there have been fears of some 
unexpected and aggressive behaviour from 
Russia (discussed below), since 1991 Estonia 
has enjoyed a decade of considerable stability 
during which it could build up its defences, 
strengthen its security and avoid repeating the 
mistakes of the past. 
Estonia's security environment 
To introduce Estonia's international environ-
ment, it is justifiable to quote the statement 
made by the Finnish President ].K. Paasikivi 
(1946-1956): "Gentlemen, please take a look 
at the map!"5 With this remark the Finnish 
President drew attention to the fact that Fin-
land was bordering a very big and powerful 
state influencing security beyond its neigh-
bours and that Finnish policies had to take 
that into consideration. 
The same geopolitical statement is largely 
valid for Estonia. However, there has been 
an important difference between the statuses 
of these two countries during the last decade. 
Estonia has been in the process of state-
building, that is, in the process of changing 
itself as well as asserting its position in the 
international system, while Finland has had 
to adapt (sometimes rapidly) to the changing 
environment. 
The security history of Estonia can be 
divided into three phases. 6 The first period 
lasted from 1988/9-1991 and it was the period 
of regaining independence. The second period 
was between 1991-1993/4 and it was mainly 
concerned with asserting independence and 
the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Estonia. The third phase began after the 
withdrawal of Russian troops in August 1994 
and it has been the period of working towards 
the achievement of a long-term security 
solution. 
The period 1988-1991 
It is important to note that during the first 
two periods of Estonian security history the 
country (even before regaining independence) 
was constantly experiencing a very straight-
forward and very present (military) threat 
from first the USSR and then from the Russian 
Federation. The credibility of that threat was 
underlined by the readiness of the USSR cen-
tral government to use, and the actual use of, 
the Soviet Army in April 1989 in Georgia, the 
Soviet Army's unplanned manoeuvres in 
Lithuania in March 1990 and its participation 
in storming the Vilnius television tower in 
January 1991. 
Therefore, each step that the Baltic in-
dependence movements took was close to a 
balancing act on the thin line between be-
coming the target of massive repression and 
achieving their political goals. These move-
ments took maximum advantage of the 
official "glasnost" policy that provided an 
excellent chance to voice loudly their discon-
tent with, and declare illegal, the forceful 
annexation of their countries by the USSR in 
1940. The concrete steps toward independ-
ence were taken in the form of declarations of 
sovereignty. Estonia declared itself a "sove-
reign state within the USSR" in November 
1988.7 The Lithuanian Communist Party 
announced its secession from the CPSU in 
December 1989, which prompted calls from 
the Soviet conservatives for a military inter-
vention in the rebellious Baltic republics 
which Gorbachev resisted. In May 1990 the 
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Soviet military leadership called for military 
intervention again after an unsuccessful 
attempt to seize the control of the Lithuanian 
Parliament. 
Mounting tension in the USSR continued 
until19 August 1991 when the conservative 
forces headed by the "State Committee for the 
State of Emergency" attempted unsuccessfully 
to seize power and declare a state of emergency 
in the USSR. When that attempt failed, the 
USSR disintegrated and on 20 August Estonia 
reclaimed its independence. 
The Period 1991-1994 
The independence regained by three Baltic 
countries signified the emergence of a new 
strategic setting. Of the Baltic States, Estonia 
and Latvia inherited large Russian-speaking 
minorities. The USSR had lost political 
control over the territories of the Baltic Sta-
tes, but it still had an impressive military 
presence there. In the case of Estonia during 
the Soviet era it had peaked at over 500 mili-
tary installations, approximately 132,000 
troops and close to 2% of Estonian territory 
being under the jurisdiction of the Soviet 
military. 
Estonia's primary task in the field of security 
after regaining independence was to achieve 
the full withdrawal of these troops. It took 
more than two years and nineteen rounds of 
negotiations to sign the agreement on 26 July 
1994 on the withdrawal of Russian troops. 
The period from August 1991 to 31 August 
1994 (the deadline of actual troop with-
drawal) was full of much more than just 
negotiations. 
The legal basis for the withdrawal of 
Russian Federation troops was established at 
the CSCE Summit in Helsinki that took place 
9-10 July 1992.9 In Estonia's view the Russian 
troops had to pull out all their forces from 
Tallinn and all offensive units and mobile 
weaponry from the entire country before the 
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end of 1992. Estonia was willing to allow 
for complex technical installations that took 
time to dismantle to remain for an additional 
period, but disagreed with Russia over the 
exact length of time. 
Further developments showed that the issue 
of withdrawal would be a complicated one. 
Russia adopted a differentiated approach to-
wards the Baltic States. On 8 September 1992 
Lithuania and Russia signed the agreement 
on withdrawal according to which all units 
of the Russian Federation should have left 
Lithuania by the 31 August 1993. Simul-
taneously it became clear that Russia was 
willing to maintain some elements there for a 
longer time. 
Parallel with the negotiation process on 
troop withdrawal, Russian Federation foreign 
policy was undergoing a major change. 
Growing domestic economic difficulties, 
diminishing political support of Yeltsin's 
administration and the strengthening of the 
conservative (right-wing) opposition had their 
impact on Russia's foreign policy.IO The 
autumn of 1992 brought two important 
developments in the Russian Federation. 
Foreign policy had become a major issue of 
domestic politics and the moderate liberals 
(to whom Kozyrev belonged) were pushed 
aside from policy-making (but not 
implementing) by the moderate conservatives 
(e.g. S. Karaganov) and hard-liners (e.g. S. 
Baburin, G. Ziuganov). This was reflected in 
the concept of "near abroad" that evolved 
gradually during 1992 connected the 
withdrawal of Russian troops to the Russian 
minority and military pensioners. Russian 
foreign minister Kozyrev defined the "near 
abroad" as a "unique, sui generis geopolitical 
space, to which nobody but Russia could 
bring peace." 11 Although assurances were 
given to Estonia that the concept of "near 
abroad" was not the basis for Russian foreign 
policy, the issue of "protecting compatriots 
abroad" found its reflection in the 1993 
military doctrine of the Russian Federation. 
The spring of 1993 was characterised by the 
return to hard-line practices in Russian 
foreign policy. The assertive line was expres-
sed by politicians and reflected in military 
exercises. 
The eventual outcome of the negotiations 
on troop withdrawal was largely determined 
by two important factors. Firstly, Russia 
received financial assistance to provide 
housing f9r the relocated military personnel 
in Russia and, secondly, Western countries 
refused to accept connecting the troop 
withdrawal to the minority, pensioner and 
other issues intensively promoted by Russian 
Federation.12 
The Periodji-om 1994 to the Present 
The end of troop withdrawal from the Baltic 
States signified again the beginning of another 
new strategic setting in the Baltic region. 
The position of the Russia's Leningrad 
Military District had changed radically. 
Alongside Moscow and North Caucasus, it 
became one of Russia's front-line military 
districts, which were all given priority in the 
development of the armed forces. As a con-
sequence of redeployment of forces from Cen-
tral Europe and the Baltic States, the overall 
number of units representing various branches 
of the armed forces increased in the Lenin-
grad Military District by the middle of the 
1990s compared with the beginning of the 
decade. The number of personnel, however, 
had fallen below 300,000. It has been 
estimated that there were nearly 1,000 battle 
tanks, 1,600 armoured combat vehicles and 
over 1,000 pieces of artillery in the Lenin-
grad Military District in the middle of the 
decade. 
The Russian Baltic Fleet was relocated to 
the easternmost extremity of the Gulf of Fin-
land and to the Kaliningrad area. Russia lost 
her ports and airfields as well as her aerial 
surveillance and air defence stations in the 
Baltic States. As a consequence of that 
development, her naval defence shifted to the 
Northern Baltic and became coastal in 
character.l3 
The responsibility for the space left behind 
by withdrawing Russian troops in the Baltic 
States was assumed by the emerging defence 
forces of the Baltic States. From the Finnish 
perspective the Baltic States possessed little 
military might. Altogether they had about 
11,000 regular soldiers, i.e. ten or so bat-
talions, which almost completely lacked heavy 
weaponry. In addition to that, the three 
countries had reserves or paramilitary forces 
totalling around 30,000. According to the 
Estonian Ministry of Defence the size of the 
regular armed forces was by the beginning 
of 1995 3,400 men and the Defence League 
had 7,500 members.14 
The next major and urgent task of Estonian 
security policy in consolidating statehood was 
concluding an agreement on a common bor-
der with the Russian Federation. 
The negotiations on the border between 
Estonia and Russia began in April1992 when 
the border constituted one of four major 
topics discussed between the two states. While 
the negotiation process was proceeding the 
Russian Federation initiated a unilateral 
demarcation of the border on the basis of 
President Yeltsin's decree of 21 June 1994. 
The main obstacle to concluding the bor-
der agreement until 1996 was the different 
positions on the Tartu Peace Treaty from 
1920. Estonia proceeded from the standpoint 
of historical continuity, in Russia's view the 
Treaty was merely a historical document. The 
change came in 1996 when it was decided to 
leave out the references to other documents 
and to focus on technical issues. By March 
1999 the border negotiations were concluded, 
the land and sea border agreements, including 
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appendices, were initialled. However, as of late 
2001, the agreement remains to be signed. The 
situation is increasingly becoming similar to 
the process of achieving the agreement on 
troop withdrawal. It is becoming recognised 
by Western countries that settling the border 
issue relies on the Russian Federation's good 
will and there are no substantial objective 
obstacles left to settle.15 
The withdrawal of troops was accompanied 
by the further deepening of tendencies in Rus-
sian foreign policy that had become visible 
earlier. The inability of the Russian Federation 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to come forward 
with sound policies towards the former Soviet 
republics greatly stimulated the increase of 
influence of other agencies and actors over 
these issues and also drove Russia into proxy 
wars on its perimeter- Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Karabakh, Georgia. 16 December 1994 sig-
nified the beginning of yet another military 
conflict on Russia's perimeter -the Chechen 
war. It lasted until September 1996 when the 
"Khasav-Yurt" agreement was signed by 
Russian and Chechen representatives. While 
this agreement did not permanently resolve 
the status of Chechnya, it was sufficient for 
the ending of hostilities and withdrawal of 
Russian troops. However, a second Russian 
intervention into Chechnya began in October 
1999 as a response to the attempt of Chechen 
warlords to export an Islamic revolution into 
Dagestan in the summer of 1999. The out-
come of that conflict is yet to be seen. 
The period after the troop withdrawal has 
been favourable for Estonia's attempts to strive 
towards the achievement of its integrat-
ion goals - memberships of the EU and 
NATO. Membership of the EC/EU was 
already declared a long-term goal by Estonia's 
first government formed after the September 
1992 electionsY 
The major milestones in Estonia's EU 
integration process have been: becoming an 
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associated partner to the WEU (November 
1994); applying for EU membership (24 No-
vember 1995); the European Council's 
decision at the Luxembourg Summit to begin 
EU accession negotiations with six countries, 
including Estonia (April1998); closing of 18 
negotiation chapters (April 2001); setting 1 
January 2003 as the date for achieving full 
readiness to join the EU. 
Estonia's relations with NATO began in 1991 
when then foreign minister of Estonia, Mr. 
Lennart Meri visited NATO headquarters in 
Brussels. That was followed by participation 
in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
(NACC) since the first meeting of Foreign 
Ministers in December 1991, and since May 
1997, in a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) that built on and replaced 
NACC. Accession to NATO has been includ-
ed in all coalition agreements of all Estonian 
governments since the restoration of in-
dependence, including the present. 
The milestones in Estonia's NATO integrat-
ion process have been: joining the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) programme (February 1994); 
joining the pfp Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) (beginning of 1995); starting the In-
tensive Dialogue with NATO (1997); stating 
the integration objective in the "Guidelines 
of the National Defence Policy of Estonia", 
approved by the Riigikogu (the Parliament) 
May 1996; work in the framework of Mem-
bership Action Plan (MAP) initiative (since 
1999). 
Russia's policies toward Estonia have since 
1994 been based mainly on its negative 
position on NATO enlargement (and the 
efforts undertaken by Central and Eastern 
European countries to become members) that 
has led to frequently resorting to political 
pressure, using for example the border issue 
as a tool.18 
Since 1994 the Russian Federation has 
adopted two National Security Concepts (in 
1997 and in 2000). These documents are not 
binding, but they reflect the development of 
security thinking in Russia. The first security 
concept (1997) put threats rising from inside 
the Russian Federation ahead of internatio-
nal threats while the next concept stressed 
again the international threats (the weakening 
of OSCE and UN, weakening of Russia's 
influence, eastward expansion of NATO) in 
addition to repeating the previously listed 
internal ones. 19 
The currently valid Russian Military Doc-
trine was affirmed by Decree No 706 of Pre-
sident Putin on 21 April 2000. It reaffirms 
the threats shown in the security concept and 
repeats the possibility of the first use of 
nuclear weapons stated earlier. This doctrine 
is the logical conclusion or formalisation of 
the conservative views on Russian military 
security which started to dominate in 1992. 
The military activity of the Russian Baltic 
fleet and also the strategic forces in the Baltic 
region has been in full concordance with 
them.20 
The actual Russian military capabilities in 
the vicinity of Estonia have remained conside-
rable despite the financial difficulties 
experienced by the Russian armed forces. The 
changes of the CFE Treaty flank regime in 
1996 provided Russia with the possibility of 
stationing roughly 400 armoured vehicles 
more than earlier in the Pskov region.21 
Certain units stationed in the proximity have 
been maintained at a high combat readiness. 
Russian nuclear capabilities in the vicinity of 
Northern Europe and Baltic States consisted 
of some 400 tactical nuclear weapons in 
1999.22 
To conclude, it is important to note that the 
period from 1994 until today has been- despite 
the impressive Russian force demonstrations 
in the Baltic region- characterised by the con-
centration of Russian military efforts in the 
southern regions of the Russian Federation as 
well as the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. 
Estonia's security solution 
The moments in time when Estonia has de-
clared and regained its independence display 
some similarities. In both cases it was the time 
when the large occupying state was dra-
matically weakened, and as a result of it, 
forced to focus its state rebuilding efforts on 
its heartland. However, its interest towards 
the surrounding areas remained strong and, 
as shown above, the policies toward these areas 
were frequently accompanied by attempts of 
intimidation. 
The quick survey of the economic and 
military power of Estonia reveals that these 
are and will be potentially very limited. 
Estonia's experience from the last ten years 
provides, however, at least one good example 
which demonstrates that in the modern 
globalising environment, under favourable 
circumstances, a small state can muster a 
considerable political power (international 
support in the form of political pressure) to 
support the attainment of its goals. This ex-
ample is the negotiation process with Russia 
on troop withdrawaJ.23 However, the sub-
sequent negotiations on the border issue 
demonstrated immediately the limitations of 
this kind of political power - Western 
countries could not possibly support and did 
not support the territorial claims (even purely 
theoretical) arising from pursuing the 
principle of historical continuity against the 
world's strongest or second strongest nuclear 
power. 
Having regained independence, Estonia had 
theoretically three basic security options: 
integration into Western structures, pursuing 
a neutrality policy or establishing closer ties 
(re-integration) with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. As the current paper 
focuses on the development of Estonia's 
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defence capabilities, the military aspect of 
these solutions will be discussed below. 
The long-term security solutions envision-
ing neutrality and/or closer ties with the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
have several inherent disadvantages. 
The Finnish experience shows that a small 
state bordering a large assertive state and 
pursuing a neutrality policy must be able to 
identify and to accommodate the crucial 
security interests of its neighbour and balance 
them with its own interests. This aspect of 
"assurance" must then be supported by 
credible "deterrence" in order to avoid fully 
depending on the good will of the larger 
neighbour.24 
If Estonia were to pursue a neutrality pol-
icy it is most likely that these principles 
would have become relevant to its security 
policy very early on. Considering the time of 
launching the "near abroad" concept (which 
resulted from Russia's internal development) 
and the increasing conservatism in Russia's 
security policy, Estonia would have faced 
problems similar to those of Finland. However, 
it is doubtful whether the limited powers of 
Estonia would have sufficed in maintaining 
independence. 
Additionally, even on the theoretical level, 
it would have been almost impossible to 
identify and to accommodate vital Russian 
interests in Estonia at a level acceptable to 
Estonia. 
Had Estonia chosen integration into the 
CIS, the risk of losing its independence would 
have been higher. In its latest National Security 
Concept the Russian Federation states openly 
that.the scale and the level of the threats to its 
security in the military sphere are increasing 
with NATO enlargement as one of these 
threats.25 
This kind of Russian threat analysis would 
probably have had a serious impact on 
Estonia. Firstly, the proximity of Estonia to 
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the second largest city of the Russian Federat-
ion (St. Petersburg) would have likely led to 
requests for deployment (non-withdrawal) of 
Russian air defence units to Estonia and the 
deployment of Russian naval units to Estoni-
an ports. Secondly, the inclusion of defending 
the interests of the compatriots living abroad 
into Russian military doctrine had a conside-
rable potential for leading to the forceful in-
corporation of Estonia into the Russian 
Federation. 
Thus, Estonia has in practice only one real-
istic security policy option: integration into 
Western economic and security structures. As 
an acknowledgement of this fact of life, 
Estonia has since the beginning of its 
independence set full integration into the EU 
and NATO as priorities for its security policy. 
This has also been reflected in Estonia's 
National Security Concept approved by the 
Parliament on 6 March 2001.26 
Having defined the integration into Wes-
tern structures as its fundamental security 
solution, Estonia has nevertheless constantly 
recognised the crucial importance of relations 
with the Russian Federation to its security. 
With an overall aim of consolidating its 
statehood vis-a-vis Russia and settling the 
various bilateral issues, the Estonian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has since 1991 pursued three 
different policies toward the Russian 
Federation: the nationalist approach (1991-
1994), the policy of "positive engagement" 
(1994-1997), and the policy of "positive 
scepticism" (since 1998-1999).27 They have 
been relatively effective in achieving their goals 
although the main problem - the different 
perception of the security environment and 
security as such -has remained. The situation 
where the Russian Federation is wary of 
NATO, and the Baltic States are not too sure 
about Russian intentions, has been summari-
sed as "a battle of perceptions" .28 The out-
come of this "battle" could be determined by 
the NATO transformation process, by the 
changes caused in international relations by 
the anti-terrorist campaign launched after the 
events of 11 September 2001, or perhaps even 
during the course of the evolving debate on 
missile defence issues. 
Estonia's Defence Policy 
In Estonia defence policy constitutes a part 
of security policy, this is a notion of security 
policy similar to that found in the Nordic 
countries. In addition to the military field, it 
covers other areas vital to the proper function-
ing of society. In Finland, for example, security 
policy consists of a foreign policy aimed at 
providing for the national security, and a 
defence policy, supported by economic and 
social activities.29 
The only official Estonian definition of the 
term "defence policy" has been so far given 
in the document "Estonia's Defence Policy 
Guidelines" approved by the Parliament on 
7 May 1996. It states: "The state's defence 
policy is a collection of political and military 
measures to guarantee the independence of 
state, the indivisible integrity of its territory, 
territorial waters, and air space, consti-
tutional order and the vital capacity of the 
nation" .30 
Estonia's National Security Concept ment-
ioned above states that defence policy in 
Estonia has been guided by the state's security 
policy. This order of policies is strongly 
supported by Estonia's experience from the 
1990s when the state had to rely mostly on 
its political power (not supported by any 
credible defence capability) to achieve its goals 
and to deter outside pressure. 
To facilitate the analysis of the development 
of Estonia's national defence, "defence po-
licy" can be defined as a flow of purposive 
action over time in the field of national 
defence.31 As a flow of action it must then 
respectively have goals, allocated resources 
and some sort of results. The environment in 
which this action has taken place was de-
scribed earlier. 
The Defence Policy Goals 
Estonia's defence policy goals proceed directly 
from the general security policy goals stipulat-
ed in the National Security Concept. They 
are: 
* To maintain the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Estonia; 
* To safeguard the existence and progressive 
development of Estonia as a democratic state; 
* To promote national welfare and preserve 
the cultural heritage, to safeguard the 
preservation of the Estonian people, Estonian 
language and culture as well as Estonian 
identity over time, while promoting interna-
tional co-operation in the globalising world. 
These goals are, in principle, more or less 
identical to the fundamental security interests 
of any other state. The first two priorities for 
achieving these goals are: the integration into 
and co-operation with European and trans-
atlantic security, political and economic struc-
tures (NATO, European Union, WEU) and 
the development of a national defence system 
that safeguards Estonia's independence. 
The National Military Strategy approved 
by Estonia's Government on 20 February 2001 
postulates the following defence policy 
objectives in support of attainment of the 
above mentioned security goals:32 
* To ensure the capability to encounter 
security risks by military means; 
* To support the integration of Estonia into 
Euro-Atlantic structures; 
* To ensure a readiness to participate in 
peace support operations and collective defence; 
* To ensure participation in national crisis 
management system. 
The above goals represent a further clari-
fication in comparison to those stipulated in 
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the earlier documents. The "Defence Policy 
Guide-lines" (May 1996) defined the prevent-
ion of aggression against Estonia as the 
primary goal of a defence policy and, in case 
of its failure, an active and passive defence 
against the aggressor throughout the territory. 
For that purpose, defence had to be built 
up in two mutually complementary direct-
Ions: 
* The development and maintenance of the 
indigenous and credible national defence 
capability for defence of the nation's vital 
interests; 
* The development of the Estonian De-fence 
Forces in a way that ensures inter-operability 
with the armed forces of NATO and WEU 
member states, and their capability to 
participate in peace support operations. 
These directions were indicated as the 
defence policy goals in several documents 
prior to the National Military Strategy_33 
The Military Strategy 
Estonia's military strategy has to solve a fun-
damental problem, that is to ensure an equally 
efficient fulfilling of the defence requirements 
arising from the need to strengthen the na-
tional defence (security) as well as the re-
quirements arising from the national 
integration efforts. Although it seems that 
these requirements naturally overlap (which 
has also been occasionally stated) it has not 
necessarily been so in all possible scenarios. 
The crucial point is that of the defence solution 
vis-a-vis an envisioned threat. 
Three major papers have attempted to solve 
this problem. The first attempt was made 
already in 1992-1993 followed by two papers 
from 1996 and 2001. 
The first attempts to formulate the con-
ceptual basis of Estonia's national defence 
were made when the Ministry of Defence 
proposal "The Fundamentals of National 
Defence" was discussed in the Parliament. 
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The draft of this paper envisioned a defence 
build-up according to the total defence 
concept. It was estimated that Estonian 
Defence Forces could train 5,500-6,000 con-
scripts annually (this figure is based on the 
number of Estonian citizens) and the total 
mobilisation reserve could constitute some 
110,000 men.34 The military defence struc-
ture would have been divided into three 
defence regions each containing one brigade 
(the creation of one light infantry, one guerilla 
and one marine brigade was envisioned). 
That document was considered incomplete 
and therefore not approved. 
The next document with a fundamental 
importance for the development of national 
defence was "Estonia's Defence Policy Guide-
lines". In addition to stipulating the general 
goal of national defence, it postulated on the 
political side the objective of joining NATO 
and WEU, and stressed the need for interna-
tional co-operation at various levels. The 
document also described the national and 
military command lines (stipulating among 
other things the development of four defence 
regions in Estonia) and the general structure 
of defence forces. Although the term "total 
defence" has not been directly used in the 
"Estonia's Defence Policy Guidelines" the 
envisioned basis of the national defence is the 
same - the maximum use of all available 
resources for defence purposes. 
The latest document, "The National Mili-
tary Strategy" (February 2001), represents the 
further development of strategic thinking in 
Estonia. It includes the declaration about 
resisting aggression in any case. The docu-
ment does not envision a direct military threat 
to Estonia presently and in the near future 
(which probably means that Estonia observes 
currently the lack of intention rather than 
lack of capability or formal reason of any 
potential aggressor). In comparison to the 
previous papers, a detailed description of the 
military threat scenarios is added (the "Guide-
lines" defined the risk as arising from great 
power ambitions and instability in the region). 
The document returns to the term "total 
defence" and stipulates it to be the basis of 
national defence. It is to be composed of 
military, economic and psychological defences 
and civil readiness. The force development is 
to proceed on the basis of Annual National 
Programs, Partnership Goals, and Partnership 
for Peace Program Planning and Review Pro-
cess in order ro achieve interoperability. 
Another big step forward is defining the 
territorial defence concept as the basis of 
military defence. For the first time Estonia has 
written into its basic documents how it is going 
to defend itself militarily if the need arises. 
The description of the different scenarios is 
also very important as it shows what the 
defence is aimed against. Estonia sees military 
resistance to the aggression covering the full 
territory of the state. The purpose of military 
resistance is to tie down the attacking forces, 
to defend strategically important areas, to gain 
the time necessary to invoke international 
reaction and to take measures aimed at hal-
ting the aggression.35 
There are three concrete military threat 
scenarios outlined in the current Estonian 
military strategy. They are: 
* Intimidation- the opponent is carrying out 
large-scale military exercises, partial sea 
blockade, over-flights of Estonia's territory. 
This scenario may be transformed into full 
naval and aerial conflict. 
* Coup Attack - the opponent carries out 
special forces' operations to seize strategic 
objects in Estonia and undermine the func-
tioning of state institutions. This scenario is 
characterised by the lack of or a very short 
warning time. Tallinn as the capital is likely 
to be the primary target. 
* Full Military Attack- it will be carried out 
as a joint operation with forces outnumber-
ing the defenders. The emphasis will be on 
the ground operations supported by the Naval 
and Air Force units. 
A quick analysis of Estonia's military 
strategy shows that it contains many features 
characteristic to the defence concepts and 
military thinking of its Scandinavian neigh-
bours. The threat scenarios are similar to those 
described in the Report by the Council of State 
to Finnish Parliament, "European Security and 
Finnish Defence." 36 The content of the "total 
defence" concept as given in the document is 
evidently based on Swedish and Danish 
experience.37The time period between 1993-
2001 can accordingly be defined as the time 
that was required for all involved sides in 
Estonia to reach consensus on fundamental 
defence issues. 
The Force Posture 
The Estonian Defence Forces are based on 
conscription. They consist of a regular com-
ponent (divided into three services: Army, Air 
Force and Navy), a voluntary defence org-
anisation, the Defence League (Kaitseliit) and 
the militarily organised institutions and units 
under the Ministry of Interior subordinated 
to a Commander in Chief during the state of 
war. The total strength of the regular armed 
forces was, as of March 2001, approximately 
8,600 men according to the information 
exchanged in the framework of Vienna 
Document. 
Of the services of the EDF, the Air Force 
and Navy are structured so that their peace-
time strength is equal to their envisioned war-
time strength. The Army is built up differently. 
In peacetime it consists mainly of training 
units, units for participation in peace support 
operations (PSO) and units in reserve. This 
means that the Army which, according to the 
National Military Strategy, bears the main 
responsibility for defending the country, relies 
on mobilisation to achieve it§ wartime 
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strength. After mobilisation there will be two 
types of Army units: the territorial units and 
the general-purpose unit (brigade). Such an 
overall defence posture is very similar to the 
Finnish defence modeL 
The defence build-up has not always pro-
ceeded in accordance with this modeL The 
envisioned fundamental force structure of the 
EDF has changed at least twice when the 
leadership of the defence forces (having 
previous experience from different armies) 
changed. The Finnish model was abandoned 
when the retired US officer General (EDF 
rank) Alexander Einseln took over the com-
mand of EDF in May 1993.38 After his resig-
nation in December 1995 the Finnish model 
was adopted again. 
The Air Force consists of the Air Force Staff, 
Air Force Base and Air Surveillance Battalion. 
Its basic task is carrying out the missions 
necessary for asserting the state's sovereignty. 
For this purpose, current efforts are focused 
on the development of the air surveillance 
capability. 
The Navy consists of Naval Staff, Naval 
Base, and Mine Countermeasures Squadron. 
Its main functions are the maintaining of 
defence readiness, carrying out the peacetime 
maritime operations and the coastal defence. 
The composition of the Estonian Navy in-
dicates that the primary efforts are directed 
to the development of its mine warfare 
capability. 
The Army consists of six training infantry 
battalions, one training air defence battalion, 
one training artillery battalion and one rapid 
reaction battalion. The latter was established 
officially in March 2001 and it is based on 
the existing Estonian peace time structures.39 
This rapid reaction battalion is to be fully 
ready to fulfil its tasks by 2005. Its main tasks 
are the defence of Estonia against surprise 
attacks and participation in the international 
peace operations. 
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There are two fundamental yet finally un-
resolved issues related to the Army: its plan-
ned size and equipment. Together they should 
represent, in theory, a balanced solution to 
counter the perceived threat within the existing 
resource constraints. In the case of Estonia it 
is very painful to strike that balance in a way 
that would be sustainable and militarily 
meaningfuL It is illustrated by the changing 
size of the envisioned wartime EDE Initially 
in 1992 the plans were to train and mobilise 
forces of 120,000-130,000.40 This number 
has been drastically reduced over the years. 
In 2000 the plans envisioned the formation of 
units to field three light infantry brigades and 
reach the EDF wartime structure of 25,000-
30,000 in the period 2000-2005.41 Plans 
presented at the Estonian Ministry of Defence 
press conference on 12 November 2001 
foresee the Army consisting of one light 
infantry brigade, one rapid reaction battalion 
and seven territorial battalions. The size of 
the wartime structure will be 20,000 men. 
Simultaneously the number of envision-ed 
defence regions has been decreased from the 
four listed in "Defence Policy Guidelines" 
from 1996 and affirmed by the Government's 
Decree No. 51 from 13 March 1998, to two 
defence regions and two special defence 
districts (Tallinn and the Western Estonian 
islands) by the end of 2000. 
Currently the Army has practically only 
light weapons (assault rifles, machine guns, 
anti-tank grenade launchers, 23mm anti-
aircraft guns, mortars, recoilless guns, some 
105mm field howitzers).42 Heavier equipment 
and especially items limited by CFE remains 
an unresolved issue. Various figures have been 
proposed. According to one assessment 200 
battle tanks, 250 armoured combat vehicles, 
400 artillery pieces, 40 combat aircraft, 30 
attack helicopters would be militarily suf-
ficient for Estonia. 43 These figures are, in 
some respect, close to these of Finland (230 
battle tanks, 1063 armoured combat vehicles, 
1893 artillery pieces, 57 combat aircraft). 
However, one must keep in mind that Estonia's 
GDP is US $4.5 billion against Finland's US 
$123 billion. 
As was pointed out above, the crucial point 
for Estonia's defence capability is the army 
reserve. The reserve units are to form the 
envisioned brigade. As a parameter for 
evaluation of Estonia's defence capability one 
can use the training and preparation of 
battalions. 44 
The EDF is training approximately 3,000 
conscripts annually. By the end of 2000 the 
number of personnel having completed the 
conscript service in the EDF reached approx-
imately 25,000 men. Exercises of the reserve 
units have been carried out since 1998. By 
the end of 2000 three major exercises had 
taken place. The first exercise involved an in-
complete battalion in 1998 and was followed 
by the two exercises of battalion-sized units 
(respectively in 1999 and 2000). The EDF is 
also training annually some 2000 reservists. 
The growing emphasis on reservists' training 
has been reflected in the Government Decree 
No 348 on the call-up of personnel for 
conscript service from 31 October 2000. For 
the first time since 1991 it included the num-
ber of reservists to be called up for training. 
The training capacity indicated above 
could by 2006 provide Estonia with 8-15 
battalions that have had at least one battalion 
level exercise. This may be quantitatively 
sufficient for the achievement of the planned 
goal of forming one light infantry brigade and 
seven territorial battalions. However, one 
should also keep in mind that any acquisition 
of heavy equipment is likely to require 
additional training of personnel. 
The Defence League is a peacetime organis-
ation with 15 regional units and various 
auxiliary organisations. Its main task is 
organising the military training of its mem-
bers and participation in the establishment 
and training of the territorial defence units. 
There were approximately 8,000 members in 
the Defence League in 2000.45 According to 
the latest projections, the EDL will prepare a 
number of units equivalent to five battalions 
by 2006. 
The Command Structure 
The Supreme Commander of National Defence 
is the President of the Republic of Estonia. 
The Government has executive powers in the 
management of National Defence. The main 
responsibility for formulation of defence pol-
icies relies on the Ministry of Defence (MOD). 
The Commander of the Estonian Defence 
Forces (CHOD) is directly in charge of all 
components of the EDF. The CHOD is respons-
ible for planning, budgeting and management 
of the EDF. 
In case of aggression the President's powers 
include: the declaration of war, ordering a 
mobilisation/demobilisation, appointing the 
wartime Commander-in-Chief of EDF with-
out waiting for a resolution to be adopted by 
Parliament. 
In peacetime the Parliament - on the 
nomination of the President - appoints the 
Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces. 
The President appoints the Chief of General 
Staff and commanders of the services on the 
basis of proposals of the CHOD and the 
Government of the Republic. The President 
also grants ranks and awards to military 
personnel. In his activities the President is 
assisted by the National Defence Council 
which is an advisory body composed of the 
Chairman of Parliament, the Prime Minister, 
the CHOD, the Minister of Defence, the Mi-
nister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs and the Chairman of National Defence 
Committee of the Parliament. 46 
The Government implements defence pol-
icies, co-ordinates the activities of local 
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governments and the institutions at the state 
level. The Government also initiates the 
drafting of legal acts and approves the 
structure and location of the EDF. The MOD 
is responsible for issuing the political guidance 
for the EDF and for drafting the defence 
budget. The MOD is also responsible for 
carrying out acquisition for the EDF, the call-
up to conscript service, drafting the required 
legal acts, etc. The MOD is composed mainly 
of civil servants. 47 
The General Staff of the EDF is the working 
body of CHOD. Each service in the EDF has 
its own staff and commander of service 
responsible for the development of that par-
ticular service. The defence regions are also 
envisioned to have commanders and staffs. 
According to "Estonia's Defence Policy Guide-
lines" the leadership of the defence regions 
must be able to continue to lead military 
resistance in case of loss of central command. 
The state level command structure where the 
President can command the CHOD directly 
while the Government is responsible for the 
development and implementation of the 
defence policies requires a good working 
relationship between the President, the Go-
vernment, the Minister of Defence and the 
CHOD as a precondition for effective func-
tioning. In the case of the opposite, there is a 
serious potential for a dire impact on the 
development of the EDF which may be seen, 
inter alia, through the appointments of the 
higher commanding echelons of EDF, and 
through the budgeting process. To rectify this 
situation the current Government has drafted 
the new Peacetime National Defence Act and 
sent it to the Parliament. The draft envisions 
the harmonisation of relations of the key 
figures of National Defence through bringing 
CHOD and the Minister of Defence closer to 
each other. 
The situation where the MOD (composed 
mainly of civil servants) is physically sepa-
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rated from the General Staff subordinated to 
CHOD also has a certain negative impact on 
the state-level defence planning. Information 
presented by Estonia on its defence planning 
under the Vienna Document in 1999 shows 
that national defence planning is carried out 
in the framework of a Planning, Programming 
and Budgeting System. The basic mechanism 
of the system is that MOD issues the political 
guidance that forms the basis for the General 
Staff to draw up plans. There are two types of 
plans - the five-year development plan and 
the annual budget. In Estonia the process of 
forming the plan is actually divided between 
two different establishments (although be-
longing to the same administrative sphere) 
which complicates the issues in comparison 
to systems where the General Staff is closely 
integrated into the Ministry of Defence. The 
first five-year plan completed in Estonia was 
the Annual National Program (ANP) drawn 
up in the framework of the Membership Ac-
tion Plan and approved by the Government 
in September 1999. 
The analysis of the military command struc-
ture is a more complicated issue. A brief com-
parison of the territorial organisation of the 
Finnish and Estonian defence provides a 
reason for asking several serious questions. For 
example: the total Finnish territory is 337,030 
km' and it is divided into three defence 
regions.48 Estonian territory is 45,227 km' and 
it is divided into two defence regions and two 
special defence districts. It means that while 
Estonia is only half the size of one Finnish 
defence region it still has almost the same 
amount of territorial defence structures as Fin-
land. Whether the Estonian solution is opti-
mal remains to be seen. 
A separate matter is the relationship between 
the services of the EDF. Until December 2000, 
when the Army Staff was inaugurated and the 
Army Commander appointed, only the Air 
Force and Navy had their own staff re-
sponsible for the development of those 
particular services. The General Staff was 
largely responsible for developing the Army 
in addition to its various other tasks. The 
introduction of an Army Staff should enable 
the General Staff to become the body dealing 
with the strategic planning and finding 
balanced solutions for all three services. 
The Acquisition Process and Defence Budget 
The procurement of equipment for the EDF is 
the responsibility of the Estonian Ministry of 
Defence. The needs for one or another type of 
equipment are specified by the General Staff. 
The general legal basis for acquisitions is 
provided by the Public Procurement Act. 
So far one large procurement of arms for 
the EDF has been completed ("procurement" 
standing for buying new equipment directly 
from the producer). It was the acquisition of 
weapons from "TAAS Military Industries" 
(Israel) in 1993. These weapons were sufficient 
for equipping the entire Estonian Defence 
Forces in the initial stages of their develop-
ment. The price was US $49 million (totalling 
US $60.4 million with interest) and the last 
payment was made in January 2000.49 Small 
numbers of arms have been procured also from 
Romania and China. 
The two ongoing major procurements are 
aimed at the development of capabilities 
necessary for asserting state sovereignty. 
According to the Estonian press the Estonian 
Border Guard was as of the first half of 2001 
in the process of procuring 20 sea surveillance 
radars from EADS Deutschland GmBH for the 
price of US$ 21-22 million. The Ministry of 
Defence is carrying out the procurement of 
long-range surveillance radar from Lockheed-
Martin. The estimated cost of the radar will 
be approximately US $11-12 million. 
The other equipment the EDF currently 
operate has been received as a donation. The 
Estonian Navy has received five mine ships, 
two patrol boats and one command ship from 
Germany, Finland and Denmark. The US has 
donated 40,500 M14 rifles, Germany 1,500 
machine guns MG 3 and Finland 19 howitzers. 
The EDF will, according to plans, receive 
additionally up to 50,000 assault rifles and 
1,500 machine guns from Sweden.50 A con-
siderable amount of equipment has also been 
donated to structures subordinated to the 
Ministry of Interior. 
As shown, there have so far been too few 
serious acquisitions to provide a solid basis 
for an evaluation of the acquisition process in 
Estonia. For example the Israeli deal be-came 
the object of a sharp criticism from the 
political opposition. There were statements 
regarding the poor quality and obsolescence 
of the arms and their price. It was also con-
sidered that these weapons created an illusion 
that Estonia was rapidly becoming heavily 
armed. This statement, however, does not 
reflect the actual state of affairs. It must be 
remembered that in 1992 there were only very 
few countries willing to sell arms to Estonia. 
In addition, Estonia was in serious need of 
them (especially considering the security en-
vironment described above) and had little or 
no experience at all in Western business 
practice. As estimated by the EDF in 2001, 
the acquired weapons were not obsolete or 
unfit to use. The main problems related to that 
particular procurement were rooted in the 
poor management of the transactions on the 
Estonian side, caused by a lack of ex-perience 
and initiative. 
Another issue is the number and the types 
of weapons acquired for the EDE It is evident 
that detailed plans for the development of the 
EDF by the end of 1992 did not exist (see en-
visioned force size above). Therefore the ac-
quisition was carried out on the basis of ex-
isting estimates and experience (there was no 
proper expertise to evaluate the weapons). As 
such, the deal with "TAAS" justified itselffully. 
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The number of infantry weapons already 
received and envisioned in the form of 
donations (close to 100,000 assault rifles) 
raises a question about the coupling of the 
acquisition process to the force plans. It is not 
quite clear yet how this figure is related to the 
planned EDF wartime structure. 
The process of air-surveillance radar pro-
curement has to a certain extent confirmed 
the above statement about the lack of 
respective experience in Estonia. As was noted 
during the procurement process, the relevant 
Estonian legislation contained several 
loopholes and shortcomings, thus preventing 
the process from proceeding smoothly and not 
giving sufficient cause for protests. 
Estonia's defence budget has experienced a 
tremendous growth since 1992. From 0.71% 
of GDP in 1992, it is expected to reach 2% in 
2002.51 In 1992 the situation in the EDF was 
such that the then Minister of Defence Olo 
Uluots expressed the hope that soldiers would 
have warm barracks by Christmas. He also 
mentioned that the state was capable of 
sustaining properly only a 1,000-man strong 
EDF.Sl The financial situation of the EDF 
started to improve after 1995 when funding 
stabilised and stayed above 1% of GDP. One 
should keep in mind that the GDP itself has 
also been growing in addition to the growth 
of sums allocated to defence. 
It is quite probable that the strongest incent-
ives for the Government raising defence ex-
penditure up to 2% of GDP have been the 
integration attempts toward NATO. The 
decision to increase defence expenditure up 
to 2% has been implemented persistently -
instead of planned expenditure of 1.4% in 
1999 the actual was 1.45%; in 2000 instead 
of 1.6% it was 1.59%; in 2001 it is to be 1.8% 
of GDP (i.e. US$ 104.8 million). 
However, an increasing amount of money 
is spent on a greater number of structures: 
before 1999 the defence budget did not include 
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the defence-oriented spending on the Border 
Guard and the Rescue Service subordinated 
to the Ministry of Interior. 53 
As the urgent needs of the EDF were 
gradually fulfilled and the payments of the 
Israeli deal have been completed, the eco-
nomic premises for the next procurement seem 
to be developing. As the payments to the Israeli 
firm were made from the annual Estonian 
defence budgets, the availability of money for 
the next procurement depends on the way the 
payments for the radar systems will be 
organised (the Government plans to take up a 
loan to fund radar procurement). As to the 
object of the next procurement, the Estonian 
authorities have expressed an interest in the 
acquisition of short-range air defence miss-
iles. This is in accordance with the declared 
acquisition priority areas: air-defence, anti-
tank systems, naval mine warfare and reserve 
mobilisation. 
The high cost of modern weapon systems in 
comparison to available funds has been in-
creasingly realised among the leaderships of 
Baltic defence structures and it has put the 
issue of joint Baltic procurement on the agen-
da. 54 One might expect the further acquisit-
ions to be made jointly by the Baltic States. 
Participation in International 
Peace Support Operations (PSOs) 
The EDF have participated in the PSOs since 
March 1994 when the first platoon took part 
in the UN mission UNPROFOR in Croatia as 
part of a Danish battalion. Since then the PSO 
units of the EDF (mainly a platoon or com-
pany-sized infantry units) have partici-pated 
in various operations. In the period 1999-
2000, over 700 military personnel (including 
77 officers) have been involved.55 In 2000 
Estonia allocated US $5.2 million to fund 
participation in peace operations. 56 
The personnel for participation in PSOs are 
trained in the Peace Operations Centre which 
is parr of the Army. It was established in 1994 
as a Single Peacekeeping Company, which 
was transformed into a Peace Operations 
Centre with a battalion structure in July 1997. 
The personnel of PSO units are volunteers 
aged 19-35 who must have completed their 
conscript service (except for the female volun-
teers). The basic training of volunteers lasts 
15 weeks. 
In absolute terms Estonian contributions to 
various PSOs have not been impressive, but if 
considered in per capita terms or in relation 
to the size of the EDF and the defence budget, 
the contribution is remarkable. 15% of all 
officers of the EDF have been on PSOs and 
in 2000 the funds allocated to participation 
in PS Os constituted roughly 7% of the defence 
budget. Such a considerable involvement is 
in accordance with the defence policy goals 
and the national integration efforts. The 
preparation for and the participation in real 
operations together with the units of NATO 
countries are an excellent method of achieving 
interoperability. 
The structures and methods used so far for 
these purposes may, however, need revision. 
As was stated above, the personnel for the PSO 
have so far been recruited from outside the 
EDF, i.e. from the contingent that has passed 
through the conscript service. The latest 
attempt to form a company this way failed. 57 
The reason was the lack of the tangible 
motivation for volunteers which raises the 
need for the EDF to adjust their policies for 
forming the PSO units. A step in that direction 
may be the plan to form a rapid reaction 
battalion that will also provide the required 
PSO capability, but the participation of that 
unit in operations abroad will strongly depend 
on Estonia's security situation. Considering 
Estonia's threat scenarios, size and geo-
graphical location, it is difficult to see the rapid 
reaction unit responsible for deterring a 
strategic surprise attack being deployed 
abroad for a prolonged time periods unless 
there is a stable and peaceful international 
situation. 
The Arms Control and 
Participation in CSBMs 
Estonia is a party to all main disarmament 
and non-proliferation agreements (Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons 
Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
In the field of conventional arms control, 
Estonia's main activities are carried out in the 
framework of the Vienna Document. The CFE 
Treaty is considered to be the cornerstone of 
European security and the ratification process 
of the adapted Treaty is being moni-tored 
closely. Estonia is considering its own possible 
accession in the future and will formulate its 
position on it once the adapted Treaty comes 
into force. 58 
Estonia's active participation in the field of 
arms control began in 1997. In that year 
Estonia hosted evaluation visits by Lithuania 
and Ireland, and an inspection by Spain. 
Estonian inspectors in turn carried our the 
first independent evaluation visit to the Russian 
Federation and participated in the Swedish-led 
evaluation visit to Spain and an inspection 
mission to Croatia. 
In pursuit of increased military transparency 
with its large neighbour, Estonia proposed and 
the Russian Federation agreed on additional 
CSBMs (Confidence and Security Building 
Measures) in 1998. These measures include 
one mutual additional evaluation visit and the 
exchange of information in CFE format. In 
September 2000 the Russian inspectors carried 
out their first additional evaluation visit in 
Estonia and in October 2000 Estonian in-
spectors conducted their third additional 
evaluation visit to Russia. 
The possibility of carrying out an additional 
evaluation visit is a good opportunity for 
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Estonia to achieve a higher Inilitary trans-
parency with the Russian Federation as the 
quotas according to the Vienna document of 
the latter tend to be used up very quickly. 
Simultaneously the Russian Federation has a 
better chance to see the development of the 
EDF striving towards NATO. 
The effect of the exchange of information 
in the CFE format might have many aspects 
and not all of them profitable to Estonia. 
Considering that Estonia's force posture is 
very similar to that of Finland, i.e. the EDF 
is a reserve force depending crucially on 
mobilisation, the exchange of information in 
CFE format may be harmful. The Finnish 
negative position toward CFE is largely based 
on the fact that the exchange of information 
in the CFE format as well as intrusive 
verification would expose Finland's wartime 
units and reveal its mobilisation system. 59 In 
the case of Estonia where these units and the 
mobilisation system are under development 
this exchange may not be a serious issue yet, 
but in the future and in the case of accession 
to NATO being postponed, the above ment-
ioned CSBM may have to be revised. 
Conclusions 
As a conclusion one can ask a number of 
questions: have Estonian policies, defence 
policy in particular, taken into account the 
geopolitical realities? Has the flow of action 
been purposive? Where is Estonia now: is it 
ready for NATO? The answer to the first 
question must be given in the context of the 
military security environment in which Es-
tonia has existed throughout the decade of 
independence. 
The historical review shows that the Es-
tonian people felt in 1991, as in 1918, the 
urgent need for Estonian defence structures 
expressed through the re-establishment of the 
Estonian Defence League. The preconditions 
for re-establishment of the EDF were in 1991 
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very different from those in 1917-1918. 
Whereas in 1917-1918 there was a sufficient 
number of trained and war-experienced 
personnel to form the armed forces on the 
spot, in 1991 there was basically an empty 
space. However, in 1917-1918 the war was 
going on and the freshly formed units saw 
action almost immediately after formation. 
Since 1991 the military security environ-
ment has been very different. Its basic re-
flection can be seen in Estonia's general 
security solution foreseeing tight integration 
into the EU and NATO. In the military field, 
the unfriendly behaviour of the Russian 
Federation has most likely pushed the EDF 
leadership to plan for the size of the EDF 
limited by demographic circumstances, but 
likely exceeding the economic capabilities of 
the country. The use of the evolving EDF in 
the field of arms control is an example of 
realistic political thinking in Estonia. Hav-
ing relied for the most of its existence on 
political power, these activities have provided 
for the development of mutual transparency 
and tackling the potential threat in an early 
stage. This is not to say that Estonia con-
siders Russia as an enemy, but to stress that 
there have been many reasons to be cautious 
and develop the EDF as quickly as possible, 
as well as to engage them in practical activi-
ties through the various international political 
frameworks. 
Consistency has not always been present in 
the development of the EDF. It has taken some 
eight years to adopt officially (on all leader-
ship levels) the total defence concept in the 
form of military strategy (though it can be 
argued that Estonia has all the time been 
building total defence). In the field of military 
conceptual thinking, the search for a generally 
adequate military defence solution for Estonia 
still continues. 
In the EDF build-up in general, the envis-
ioned force posture has changed at least twice, 
and the target force size has been constantly 
reduced. The drastic decrease of the planned 
size of the ED F by a factor of six between 
1992 and 2001 illustrates the difficulty in stri-
king the balance between modern require-
ments, a militarily significant force size (and 
its equipment) and the economic capabilities 
of Estonia. 
Quite another issue is whether this balance 
exists even in theory and whether Estonia can 
indeed muster enough economic power to 
develop, equip and maintain an EDF capable 
of resisting the large-scale attack for a con-
siderable time. At first glance the very rough 
comparison between Estonia and Finland 
presented above reveals perhaps too dramatic 
a difference to be rectified and thus raises 
doubts whether Estonia could enjoy a suf-
ficient level of military security outside NATO 
at all (which again supports the idea of inte-
gration). It is evident, however, that Estonia 
must do its maximum to strengthen its own 
defence capabilities to support its security 
policy. The acquisitions made so far clearly 
indicate the determination to do so. 
The above developments have taken place 
with the national command line containing 
a serious potential for misunderstandings and 
strife. This has certainly had its effect. Indeed 
the EDF since their establishment have had 
four CHODs and three acting CHODs. This 
phenomenon is explicable in the context of 
the rapid development not only of the EDF, 
but also the whole state: since regaining 
independence and until 2002 Estonia has had 
nine governments. The impact of a rapidly 
changing political environment on the EDF 
has been inevitable. 
The separation of MOD from the General 
Staff can be listed as another shortcoming in 
the command line affecting particularly the 
planning process. One of the reasons for this 
is historical- the General Staff was establish-
ed before the Ministry of Defence. 
All in all one can say that there has actually 
been a purposive flow of action which has 
been characterised by the general (still on-
going) socialisation of various levels of soci-
ety to Nordic military thinking. The hinder-
ing factors have been perhaps the intimidation 
attempts from the Russian side (which never-
theless led to accelerated defence develop-
ment), the difficulty of finding a sustainable 
and meaningful military defence solution for 
Estonia, and the lack of experience in military 
build-up and defence management. At the 
lower level the EDF have demonstrated a very 
quick learning and adapting capability 
through the successful participation in PSOs 
and the same can be said about the lessons 
learned in the course of acquisitions made so 
far. 
The short answer to the question 'is the EDF 
a valid candidate for NATO membership?' is 
"yes" and "no" depending on what kind of 
NATO Estonia is trying to join. 
If it is a NATO placing greater emphasis on 
collective defence, the aspirant's ability to 
contribute to Alliance's security, and gee-
strategic factors, then the candidacy of Estonia 
may be strongly questioned. It is evident 
without any deep analysis that it is practically 
impossible to build up military structures 
similar or equal to those of the Western 
countries or the new NATO members in 10 
years. In addition, in the case of Estonia it is 
even questionable whether its economy 
permits the build-up of structures capable of 
contributing considerably to the security of 
other Allies through collective defence as 
happened during the Cold War. Estonia's 
credibiliry can be further reduced by fairly 
pessimistic statements about the ability of the 
latest new members to contribute militarily 
to the accomplishment ofNATOs missions. GO 
If NATO is going to be transformed into an 
organisation with a stronger emphasis on 
collective security then Estonia is indeed a 
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valid candidate. It has demonstrated the de-
termination and commitment to participate 
in international PSOs, it has developed certain 
capabilities and seeks to develop a better sup-
port for them in the EDF. This commitment 
has been constant despite the frequent changes 
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in the political and military leadership. In ge-
neral Estonia has formulated an integrated 
view of what it considers necessary to do in 
the future and has developed a strong basis 
for the defence build-up as of late 2001. 
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